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Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying social learning
in infancy: infants neural processing of the effects
of others actions
Markus Paulus,1 Sabine Hunnius,2 and Harold Bekkering2
1Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany and 2Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
Social transmission of knowledge is one of the reasons for human evolutionary success, and it has been suggested that already human infants possess
eminent social learning abilities. However, nothing is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms that subserve infants acquisition of novel action
knowledge through the observation of other peoples actions and their consequences in the physical world. In an electroencephalogram study on social
learning in infancy, we demonstrate that 9-month-old infants represent the environmental effects of others actions in their own motor system, although
they never achieved these effects themselves before. The results provide first insights into the neurocognitive basis of human infants unique ability for
social learning of novel action knowledge.
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The human ability for the cultural transmission of knowledge is con-
sidered one of the reasons for human evolutionary success (Gould,
1979; Habermas, 1985; Tomasello et al., 1993), and numerous classical
studies showed that humans acquire relevant action knowledge and
skills by social learning (e.g. Bandura, 1986). Importantly, unlike mem-
bers of other species (for a classical example, see Thorndike, 1911),
human infants already possess eminent social learning capabilities in
infancy. Striking examples of early social learning are provided by
studies on infants’ imitation. These behavioral studies show that
from early on in life, infants are able to learn from the observation
of others’ actions (e.g. Barr and Hayne, 1999; Forman et al., 2004;
Elsner, 2007; Hauf and Aschersleben, 2008; Hewlett et al., 2011).
However, the neurocognitive mechanisms that enable social learning
in infancy are yet to be discovered.
One important aspect that humans have to master throughout their
lives is to learn about the consequences that particular actions have in
their environment and use this knowledge to guide their own actions.
To explain the ability to rely on this knowledge, it has been suggested
that people acquire bidirectional action–effect associations through
repeated co-occurrences between actions and their effects. When
they subsequently intend to reproduce an effect or perceive the same
effect again, the associated motor program is activated (Elsner and
Hommel, 2001; for a recent review see Nattkemper et al., 2010).
Following the ideomotor account, such bidirectional action–effect as-
sociations subserve intentional action control and thus constitute the
cognitive basis of voluntary action (Hommel et al., 2001; Kunde et al.,
2007; Hommel, 2009), even though people are often not conscious
about these processes (Custers and Aarts, 2010; Kunde et al., 2012).
Research has suggested that already infants (e.g. Elsner and
Aschersleben, 2003; Hauf et al., 2004; Verschoor et al., 2010; Paulus
et al., 2012) and young children (Kray et al., 2006) learn about the
consequences of their own actions by acquiring bidirectional ac-
tion–effect associations. However, given the relevance of social learning
in human development, the question arises of how are infants able to
learn about the consequences of others’ actions merely through obser-
vation (i.e. when they actually never performed this action
themselves)?
We suggest that infants can acquire action–effect associations
through observation and that this ability might thus form an import-
ant neurocognitive mechanism subserving infants’ ability for social
learning (cf. Paulus et al. 2011b). Evidence for this claim comes
from behavioral studies showing that infants imitate actions that
lead to salient action effects. Paulus et al. (2011a) showed that
14-month-old infants imitate an unusual action (turning on a lamp
with the head) only when the action is followed by a salient action–ef-
fect (i.e. the light effect). Examining younger infants, Hauf and
Aschersleben (2008) presented 7- to 9-month-old infants with an ex-
perimenter performing two actions on a device. The results showed
that the infants preferentially reproduced the action that initially led to
a salient action–effect. The authors speculated that infants had
acquired a novel action–effect association through observation of an-
other person’s action and that this novel action–effect association
guided infants’ imitation behavior. Yet, more direct evidence is
required as these results could partly be subserved by simple stimu-
lus–response learning (Klossek et al., 2008). In other words, following
Bandura’s (1986) classical differentiation between social learning and
behavior demonstration of acquired knowledge, these behavioral stu-
dies provide clear evidence for the latter, but leave open which neuro-
cognitive mechanism underlies the former (i.e. social learning).
To investigate the hypothesis that infants can acquire action–effect
associations through observation, we conducted a training study with
9-month-old infants, using electroencephalogram (EEG). During a
1-week training period, infants observed on a daily basis how a care-
giver played in front of them with a novel rattle that produced a spe-
cific sound effect when it was shaken [action sound (AS)]. In addition,
they listened every day to a second sound that was presented with a
voice recorder [non-action sound (NAS)]. It has been shown that in-
fants of this age are able to smoothly grasp and manipulate objects
(von Hofsten and Ro¨nnqvist, 1988) and they should thus be able to
relate another person’s hand actions to their own motor repertoire (cf.
Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Longo and Berthental, 2006). After the training
period, infants’ electrophysiological responses to AS and NAS as well as
a novel sound [control sound (CS)] were assessed (note that we
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counterbalanced between infants, which of the three available sounds
served as AS, NAS and CS).
If infants indeed acquired bidirectional action–effect associations
during the observation of somebody else’s rattle action, the perception
of the rattle’s sound should activate the associated motor program.
Importantly, research has provided evidence that cortical motor acti-
vation is reflected in a power decrease (i.e. a suppression) in the 6–9Hz
mu frequency band over sensorimotor areas (van Elk et al., 2008;
Southgate et al., 2009, 2010; Meyer et al., 2011; Nystro¨m et al., 2011;
Reid et al., 2011; for a review, see Marshall and Meltzoff, 2011). The
mu frequency band is related to other alpha-like rhythms, but is
thought to be an independent phenomenon due to differences in
source generation or its reaction to external events (for a review, see
Pineda, 2005). For example, in a previous study from our laboratory
infants’ electrophysiological response to a rattle sound was assessed,
which they had learned to actively produce during a training session
(Paulus et al., 2012). When infants were subsequently presented with
the rattle sound, they showed a stronger suppression of the mu fre-
quency band over central sites compared with when they were listening
to two other sounds they had never produced. The fact that infants
showed more motor activation when they perceived the sound effect of
their previous action provided electrophysiological evidence for ac-
tion–effect binding in infants. Marshall et al. (2011) measured EEG
in 14-month-old infants during action observation and execution. The
analysis provided evidence for a similar power decrease in the 6–9Hz
frequency band for observed and executed actions over central sites
(i.e. cortical motor areas). Reid et al. (2011) presented 14-month-old
infants with actions they were able to perform with actions outside the
infants’ motor repertoire or with a baseline condition. The authors
reported greater suppression of the mu rhythm for actions within
the infants’ motor repertoire than for the other two conditions, sug-
gesting that the perception of an action leads to automatic motor
activation.
Thus, based on theories that propose that bidirectional action–effect
associations subserve intentional action control (Hommel et al., 2001)
and based on evidence that infants and young children can learn
through the observation of others’ actions (e.g. Hewlett et al., 2011;
Paulus et al., 2011a), we hypothesized that infants would associate the
motor code representing the perceived rattle action with the represen-
tation of the perceived rattle sound (i.e. AS). This should be reflected
in a stronger decrease in power in the infants’ mu frequency band
above cortical motor areas for AS compared with the other two
sounds.
METHODS
Participants
The final sample consisted of 11 infants (range: 8 months, 25 days to 9
months, 24 days; average: 287 days; 4 boys). Seven infants were tested
but not included in the final sample due to equipment failure (n¼ 1),
parental interference (n¼ 2) or fussiness (so that too few trials could
be collected and/or the data contained strong motor artifacts; n¼ 4).
Participants were recruited from public birth records and were healthy,
full-term infants without any complications. Informed consent for
participation was given by the infants’ parents. The families received
a baby book or monetary compensation for their visit.
Stimuli
The stimulus material of the training phase consisted of three identical
cylindric objects (d¼ 4.5 cm; h¼ 6 cm; see Figure 1) as well as voice
recorders (Voicetracer 600, Philips, Germany). The cylindric objects
were made out of red plastic and produced three different sounds (due
to their content which could be a bell, a couple of metal disks or
screws) when shaken. They could thus be used as rattles. Each voice
recorder contained recordings from one of the three sounds, so that
they could be played to the infants. The voice recorders were inserted
into cylindrical plastic boxes that served as containers. This enabled
parents to put the voice recorders in a stable position on the table.
The stimulus material of the test phase consisted of different record-
ings of the same three sounds. Different recordings were included to
keep infants’ attention (cf. van Elk et al., 2008). Each stimulus lasted
for 2000ms. The auditory stimuli were recorded digitally using a
MOTU 828ml2 audio interface on a Mac Pro and an AKG-3000 con-
denser microphone. Recordings were made in an acoustically isolated
room at 16-bit, 44,100KHz quality. They were controlled for pitch and
loudness. Furthermore, to maintain the child’s attention and to avoid
head movements during in the test phase, geometric shapes were pre-
sented randomly as background pictures on a computer screen.
Procedure and design
Training phase
Infants and parents were visited at home and handed over one of the
rattles and one voice recorder by the experimenter (see Figure 1).
Parents were instructed verbally and by means of a written training
schedule about the training procedure. It was indicated that they had
to train with their infant every day for about 1 week. They were asked
to train 5min each day with the rattle and 5min with the voice re-
corder. The rattle training consisted of shaking the rattle in front of the
infants at a distance of approximately 1–2m (i.e. out of reach). For the
training with the voice recorder, the container was placed at approxi-
mately the same distance. It was switched on by a caregiver so that the
sound was automatically played. In both conditions, infants were
either seated in an infant chair or on a caregiver’s lap. During the
training with the rattle and the voice recorder, parents were instructed
to remove any other toys from the infant and to avoid any other
sounds in the background (e.g. radio). To ensure compliance with
the instructions, parents were asked to confirm the exact training
times every day on the printed training schedule and provide infor-
mation on how their infant reacted to the stimuli.
It was counterbalanced within participants and between days with
which object infants started the training (i.e. rattle or voice recorder).
It was balanced between participants which of the three sounds was the
action-related sound (AS; caused by shaking the rattle), the
non-action-related sound (NAS; played automatically from the voice
recorder) and CS (not experienced during the training phase).
Test phase
The study was set up as a within-subject design as the participants were
presented with all three auditory stimuli. The test session was sched-
uled 1 day after the last training session in an infant EEG laboratory.
To this end, the infant was seated in an infant seat that was placed in
front of a computer monitor. The parent was sitting behind the infant.
A loudspeaker was located behind the screen. The three auditory sti-
muli (i.e. AS, NAS and CS) were presented in a pseudo-randomized
order (i.e. the same stimulus was never presented more than two times
in a row) by the software Presentation 11.07 (Neurobehavioral
Systems, USA). In addition, pictures of abstract geometrical figures
were displayed on the screen in a random order that was unrelated
to the auditory stimuli. Any differences in EEG power between the
three sounds could therefore not be due to the geometrical figures.
The experiment was conducted until the child lost overt attention, as
evidenced by, for example, crying or falling asleep.
EEG was recorded after 1 week of training using an infant-size cap
with 30 Ag/AgCl active electrodes (EasyCap, Germany) with a layout
following the 10/20 system using a BrainAmp AC amplifier with a
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band-pass filter of 0.1–125Hz at a sampling rate of 500Hz. All elec-
trodes were referenced online to a central reference electrode and
re-referenced offline to an average over all electrodes.
Data analysis
EEG data were analyzed using Brain Vision Analyzer (Brain Products,
Germany). The EEG data were segmented into 2000ms time frames
per trial, as the stimuli were presented for 2000ms. Trials with artifacts
were rejected by means of the automatic artifact rejection function of
Brain Vision Analyzer (maximum difference of values in a segment
equals 250mV). To be included in the analysis, infants needed to have
at least nine valid trials per condition. Fast Fourier transformations
were conducted over each trial, and grand averages were calculated for
all three conditions.
On average, 14% of all trials were excluded from further analysis,
leaving on average 26.8 trials for each condition per infant. A two-way
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the
within-subject factors hemisphere (C3 and C4) and sound condition
(AS, NAS and CS) and number of included trials as dependent variable
revealed only a significant effect of hemisphere, F(1,10)¼ 8.226,
P< 0.05 (all other Ps > 0.47), showing that more trials were recorded
for C3 (mean¼ 25.9, SE¼ 2.4) compared with C4 (mean¼ 27.9,
SE¼ 2.8).
In order to ensure that possible differences in mu suppression be-
tween conditions were not due to differences in motor activity, we
coded infants’ movements from the video recordings (made at
29Hz). To this end, trial information was assigned to the video record-
ings during the experiment. The data were analyzed on a
frame-by-frame basis for motor activities of the child in each trial
(cf. Reid et al., 2011). Infants’ movement activity was coded for each
trial on a four-point scale (0: no movements; 1: low activity; 2:
medium activity and 3: high activity) for movements of the hands
and for movements of other body limbs. Movement of the hands
was included as an extra variable as one could assume that during
the training phase the rattle sound was connected to the motor pro-
gram of the hands so that the perception of the rattle sound could
facilitate hand movements. For statistical analysis, data of the two
measures (movements of the hand and movements of other body
limbs) were entered into an ANOVA for dependent measures with
the within-subject factors condition (AS, NAS and CS) and body
part (hands and others). This analysis yielded no significant effect
(all Fs < 1).
RESULTS
Since we were interested in motor activation in response to the three
stimuli, we selected the electrodes C3 and C4 for statistical analysis and
averaged the mu frequency power over the 6–9Hz frequency band (cf.
Nystro¨m et al., 2011; Reid et al., 2011; Paulus et al., 2012). Data were
entered into a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with the
within-subject factors hemisphere (C3 and C4) and sound condition
(AS, NAS and CS).
The analysis revealed only a significant main effect of sound condi-
tion, F(2,20)¼ 6.651, P< 0.01, p2¼ 0.40 (all other Ps > 0.40; see
Figure 2A for a topographical representation of the results and
Figure 2B for the grand average over C3 and C4). For further analyses,
the data were averaged across hemispheres. Post hoc paired sample
t-tests revealed that mu suppression was stronger in condition AS
than in conditions NAS and CS, t(10)¼ 3.010, P¼ 0.01 and
t(10)¼ 3.078, P¼ 0.01, respectively, whereas no significant difference
was found between the latter two conditions, t(10)¼ 0.098, P¼ 0.92.
Fig. 1 The objects used in the training phase of the experiment. On the left side is the rattle and on the right side the container in which the voice recorder was inserted.
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This suggests that infants showed greater motor activation when per-
ceiving AS than when perceiving NAS and CS.
DISCUSSION
This study is among the first to examine the neural mechanisms that
subserve social learning in infancy. It shows that 9-month-old infants
display motor activation when they perceive an effect (e.g. here, a
sound) that was previously produced by another person’s action,
that is even though they never produced this effect themselves. This
finding extends previous studies on the impact of infants’ own
first-hand action experiences on their action perception
(Sommerville and Woodward, 2005; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Paulus
et al., 2012) to the realm of social learning of novel relations between
actions and their consequences in the physical world. It provides evi-
dence that human infants represent effects of other’s actions within
their own motor system and speaks thus to the neurocognitive mech-
anisms of social learning in infancy.
The results suggest that during the perception of the rattle action,
infants were able to relate the other person’s movement to their own
motor repertoire (i.e. activated the corresponding motor code; motor
resonance) and associated the cognitive representation of the perceived
effect (i.e. the sound) with the activated motor code and thus acquired
a novel action–effect association through the observation of another
person’s action. Subsequently, the perception of the sound activated
the corresponding motor program in the motor cortex (e.g. Elsner
et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2002; Heyes, 2010) and led to the suppression
of the mu frequency band (Paulus et al., 2012). The present results
therefore provide evidence for the claim that infants in the first year of
life are able to acquire bidirectional action–effect associations through
observing others’ actions and the consequences of these actions in the
physical world.
Importantly, our results cannot be explained by differences between
the three auditory stimuli, as the use of the three sounds as AS, NAS
and CS was counterbalanced over participants. In addition, the fact
that mu suppression was significantly stronger for AS compared with
another familiar and the unfamiliar sound excludes the possibility that
these differences were merely due to a familiarity or a novelty effect.
Another alternative account that should be considered is that infants
might have been more excited when being presented with the rattle
compared with the voice recorder and that this difference might ex-
plain the effect. Although we do not have detailed observations of the
infants’ behavior during the training sessions that took part in the
parents’ home, we think that it is unlikely that our effects can be
reduced to possible differences in excitement during the training.
First, we assessed infants’ EEG to the rattle sounds after the rattle
training and controlled for the impact of movements. Second, if the
rattle stimulus would have been indeed more exciting to the infants, we
would expect a general increase in brain activity, including, for
Fig. 2 (A) The topographic maps representing the differences in the EEG power spectrum between perception of AS and NAS (left) as well as AS and CS (right) in the mu frequency band (6–9 Hz). (B) Displays
The grand averaged EEG power over the mu frequency band for the three auditory stimuli AS (dark bar on the left), NAS (light gray bar in the middle) and CS (intermediate gray bar on the right) over the C3
and C4 electrode sites. Error bars indicate the standard errors of the means.
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instance, areas associated with visual attention. As revealed by the
topographic maps though, the differences in activation we found
were localized above and confined to cortical motor areas.
Notwithstanding this finding, one could argue that infants were
more excited during the rattle training and associated this unspecific
motor activity with the rattle sound. Yet, research has shown that for
action–effect learning to take place, probabilistic contingency and tem-
poral contiguity are very important factors (Elsner and Hommel,
2004). As it is rather unlikely that infants’ motor activity was contin-
gent and contingent with respect to the rattle sound (which appeared
irregularly according to each parent’s individual shaking rhythm), we
do not think that our effect can be reduced to differences in infants’
motor activity.
Infants were presented with the rattle sound being caused by a hand
movement, and consequently we expected the perception of the rattle
sound to activate hand-related motor programs. Accordingly, based on
findings that a suppression of the mu rhythm at C3 and C4 indicates
the activation of hand-related motor actions (Pfurtscheller et al., 1997)
whereas central midline activation reflects foot activation (see Marshall
and Meltzoff, 2011), we expected an activation of the motor cortex at
left and right mid-central sites. In line with this expectation, in a pre-
vious study from our laboratory infants’ electrophysiological response
to a rattle sound was assessed, which they had learned to actively
produce with their hand during a training session (Paulus et al.,
2012). When infants were subsequently presented with the rattle
sound, they showed a suppression of the mu frequency band at C3
and C4. The distribution of activity in this study as evidenced in the
topographic maps also displayed a clear mid-central pattern. Given
that previous research hypothesized that mid-central activation pat-
terns might reflect the cortical activation of hand-related motor cortex
(Marshall and Meltzoff, 2011; Pfurtscheller et al., 1997), the activation
pattern of this study could suggest that the perception of the rattle’s
sound might have led to an activation of the hand areas in the infants’
motor cortex. Yet, more research is needed to investigate whether the
perception of another person’s action elicits effector-specific motor
activation in infants.
It should be noted that the topographic maps provide evidence for a
clear focus of alpha suppression above cortical motor areas (i.e. mu
suppression). This pattern renders it unlikely that our effect was due to
differences in visual attention as one could have argued that infants
were more inclined to search for the rattle when perceiving the rattle
sound. Rather, the distribution of the effect suggests that the difference
in the activation pattern was restricted to central sites and thus indi-
cative for motor activation.
Cortical motor activation during action observation has been
described in several infant studies providing evidence for the existence
of a perception-action matching system early in development (e.g.
Southgate et al., 2010; Stapel et al., 2010; Marshall et al., 2011;
Nystro¨m et al., 2011; Reid et al., 2011; Paulus et al., 2012). This
study investigated whether infants would also show motor activation
when perceiving the effect of another person’s action, i.e. an action that
infants never produced themselves. Our findings thus extend this line
of research to the realm of social learning and suggest that infants
represent the effects of others’ actions in their own motor system,
even if they never actively produced achieved these effects. They also
suggest that action matching and learning about action effects play an
important role in social learning. Additional support for this view
comes from a studies by van Elk et al. (2008) as well as Reid et al.
(2011) who demonstrated that an observed action, which is not within
infants’ motor repertoire, does not lead to cortical motor activation.
Moreover, directly investigating the impact of action matching and
action effects on infants’ imitation, Paulus et al. (2011a) found that
14-month-old infants were unlikely to imitate an action that was
presented in a way they could not relate to their own action repertoire
that did not have a salient action–effect.
It remains an open question, though, how infants process and learn
from the observation of actions that are outside their own motor rep-
ertoire. Interestingly, a recent study shows that infants can learn to
simulate another person’s tool use actions when they have ample op-
portunity to observe how the other person handles the tool (Boyer
et al., 2011). It is possible that by means of a direct comparison pro-
cess, infants come to relate the tool to their own hand (Gerson and
Woodward, 2012) and are thus able to also learn from actions that are
initially not within their own motor repertoire.
This study relates to research suggesting an important role of ideo-
motor learning and action–effect binding in early development. In
particular, it has been suggested that infants’ acquisition of
action–effect relations plays an important role in the development of
action control (e.g. Klein et al., 2006; Verschoor et al., 2010; Paulus
et al., 2012) and for an understanding of and learning from others’
actions (Baldwin et al., 2001; Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Kira´ly
et al., 2003; Hauf and Aschersleben, 2008; Paulus, 2012). Hauf and
Aschersleben (2008), for example, presented 7- to 9-month-old infants
with an experimenter performing two actions on a device. The results
showed that the infants preferentially reproduced the action that ini-
tially led to a salient action–effect. The authors speculated that infants
had acquired a novel action–effect association. Our study directly
speaks to these findings, as it provides first direct evidence that by
the end of the first year of life infants are indeed able to acquire
action–effect associations through observational learning.
This study is informative for electrophysiological research on the
significance of the mu rhythm (cf. Pineda, 2005). It has been suggested
that a power decrease in the mu rhythm reflects cortical motor acti-
vation (for a review, see Marshall and Meltzoff, 2011). Although a large
body of behavioral tasks with adults (Elsner and Hommel, 2001;
Kunde et al., 2002; Kiesel and Hoffmann, 2004) and infants
(Verschoor et al., 2010), as well as neuroimaging studies (Elsner
et al., 2002; Melcher et al., 2008) provided evidence for cortical
motor activation when perceiving effects of one’s own previous ac-
tions, less is known how the perception of action effects affects the
mu rhythm. To date, only one study demonstrated mu suppression for
the perception of previously produced effects (Paulus et al., 2012). This
study adds to this literature by suggesting that the mu rhythm is not
only modulated through observed actions (cf. Marshall and Meltzoff,
2011) but also through the perception of an action’s effect, which was
previously produced by someone else.
Given the limitations of EEG research with infants (e.g. with respect
to the number of possible conditions in a study), this study leaves a
number of questions open for future investigations. In particular, one
could compare mu suppression for the perception of an action’s effect
with mu suppression for the perception of the action itself or for the
execution of the action and the perception of the action’s effect. Such a
comparison would allow for the assessment of commonalities and
differences in motor activation provided by both stimuli. If one were
to find similar electrophysiological patterns for both stimuli (e.g. per-
ception of an action’s effect and the perception of the action itself), this
would support our claim that the perception of an action’s effect ac-
tivates the same motor program as the observation (or execution) of
this action.
Furthermore, following Bandura’s (1986) classical distinction be-
tween social learning and the behavioral demonstration of acquired
knowledge, this study investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms
underlying the former. It provides evidence that 9-month-old infants
are able to acquire action–effect associations through perceiving
others’ actions and their effects. Based on previous studies that show
that the observation of others’ actions and the effects of these actions
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affect infants’ imitation (e.g. Elsner and Aschersleben, 2003; Hauf and
Aschersleben, 2008; Paulus et al., 2011a), we suggest that the social
learning of action–effect associations subserves infants’ imitation of
others’ actions. Future research could investigate this claim more dir-
ectly by assessing infants’ behavioral performances and their electro-
physiological responses simultaneously when perceiving the effects of a
previously observed action. A relation between electrophysiological
patterns and imitative performances would provide the strongest evi-
dence for our claim.
Taken together, many studies and theories have suggested that the
unique human ability for social learning plays an important role in the
evolutionary success of Homo sapiens and have pointed to fascinating
social learning abilities not only in adults (e.g. Olsson et al., 2007) but
also in infants and young children (e.g. Vygotsky, 1978; Gould, 1979;
Bandura, 1986; Barr and Hayne, 1999; Hewlett et al., 2011). However,
how infants acquire novel action knowledge (i.e. which neurocognitive
mechanisms underlie this ability) has remained an open question. The
present findings provide preliminary evidence that infants’ acquisition
of bidirectional action–effect associations through observation might
be a key mechanism in the human ability to learn from and imitate
others’ actions (Paulus et al., 2011a) and might thus form the
neurocognitive basis of humans’ unique ability for social learning.
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